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Those who really deserve praise are the people who, while human
enough to enjoy power, nevertheless pay more attention to justice than they
are compelled to do by their situation.
-

Thucyclides

I. INTRODUCTION
The character of a regulatory agency is most severely tested at the
zenith of its power. When the Federal Communications Commission
("FCC" or "Commission") breaks free of the limitations imposed by the
law, the Commission's leadership sets its own course. It is at these times,
when legal oversight is at a minimum, that it becomes most important for
the agency to "pay more attention to justice." Unfortunately, as outlined
below and in Commissioner Furchtgott-Roth's separate statements, the
FCC has often failed this test of institutional character.' Indeed, the
Commission seems to capitalize on these situations to achieve goals that
would not be attainable through traditional policymaking. The result is a
far-reaching, unenforceable, opaque and ultimately arbitrary policy and
process that undermines both the Commission's standing and the public
interest.
These criticisms spring from three fundamental principles of
regulatory policy: (1) an agency should never act beyond its jurisdictioneven when it may "get away with it"--because it detracts from its
statutorily defined mission, (2) an agency should not promulgate
obligations that it is not prepared to enforce fully because it undermines the
agency's credibility, and (3) rules should be generally applicable and
transparent to the public. Following these principles, the Commission can
readily achieve its public policy objectives without resorting to its current
circuitous approach.
1. Many of the concerns and issues outlined grow out of positions developed over the
past few years in Commissioner Furchtgott-Roth's office.
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Nonetheless, in at least the three contexts set forth below-license
transfers, national security review, and consent decrees-the Commission
has proven to be something less than a benevolent master. In each case, the
Commission has an appropriate and limited role to play under the
Communications Act of 1934 ("Act"). Ineach case, however, that role lies
outside the traditional scope of judicial review. Unfortunately, in each case,
the current Commission leadership uses the confluence of the vulnerability
of licensees and the absence of legal oversight to advance its particular
public policy agenda; impose many requirements it cannot or will not
enforce; and facilitate the creation of vast company-specific regulatory
regimes that undermine transparency and predictability.
H-.EVASION OF LEGAL OVERSIGHT
The Commission's ability to exploit its power to achieve policies
outside its mandate depends on the agency's ability to escape judicial and,
to a lesser degree, congressional review. In theory, a number of forces
should constrain the FCC's authority. Most fundamentally, the Act, like
other delegations of congressional authority, delineates the scope of the
Commission's authority over the communications marketplace.2 Essential
to this statutory scheme is the ability of aggrieved parties to obtain judicial
review of the FCC's actions.3 Through judicial review, the courts limit the
Commission's discretion to act by enforcing legislative limitations and
holding the FCC to standards of reasoned decisionmaking and
constitutional norms.4 Beyond the limits imposed by the Act and the courts,
Congress impacts the FCC's authority through appropriations and
oversight.5 Theoretically, these constraints require the Commission to stay
2. Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. (1994) as amended by the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified at scattered
sections of 47 U.S.C.).
3. 47 U.S.C. § 402 (Supp. IV 1998).
4. Courts have not been shy in holding the Commission to these standards. See Iowa
Utils. Bd. v. FCC, 120 F.3d 753 (8th Cir. 1997); United States Telecom Ass'n v. FCC, 2000
NVL 1059852 (D.C. Cir. 2000); US West, Inc. v. FCC, 182 F.3d 1224 (10th Cir. 1999).
5. Among the three areas discussed below, congressional oversight has come closest to
tempering the Commission's approach to license transfers. See, e.g., Fairnessin Telecomms.
License Transfers Act of 1999: Hearings on HR. 2533 Before the Subconun. on
Telecoms., Trade, and Consumer Protectionof the House Commerce Comm., 106th Cong.
(1999); Expeditious Action on Telecomms. Merger Act: Hearings on S. 467 Before the
Subcomm. on Antitrust,Business Rights, and Competition of the Senate Judiciary Comm.,

106th Cong. (1999). The prospect of a legislative solution, which would put specific limits
on the agency's license-transfer authority, has not gone unnoticed at the agency. These
activities and the vigorous dissents of Commissioner Furchtgott-Roth have contributed to
some license reforms. See Chairman's News Release, "FCC Implements Predictable,
Transparent, and Streamlined Merger Review Process" (Jan. 12, 2000) (creating Merger
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within its regulatory and jurisdictional boundaries and to engage in
reasoned and publicly documented decision-making procedures.
In practice, however, traditional limitations on the Commission's
authority have not always applied. In license-transfer proceedings, national
security reviews, and consent decrees, procedural loopholes and
circumstance create opportunities for the Commission to operate free of the
discipline imposed by the statute and administrative procedure.
Certain license-transfer proceedings provide perhaps the most visible
example. When license-holding companies merge, the FCC reviews the
proposed license transfer to the new merged entity. The FCC's statutory
licensing authority only requires that the transfer be in the "public interest,
convenience, and necessity," which provides little detailed guidance on the
structure or standards that should be associated with the review process. 6
Months after the initial merger plans are announced, the FCC's licensetransfer approval is often the only thing that stands in the way of
consummation of the transaction. Sometimes these transactions, such as the
mergers of SBC/Ameritech and Bell Atlantic/GTE, are worth billions of
dollars.7 In these mega-merger license transfers, the Commission and
applicants typically engage in a high-stakes regulatory dance in which
applicants "volunteer" to take certain actions or to refrain from certain
actions as the quid pro quo for favorable agency consideration. The
resulting "voluntary" conditions emerge from an elaborate and often secret
process of demands and "negotiations." The licensees are left with little
choice but to engage in this process or face tremendous delays or outright
rejection of the transfer. Indeed, there appears to be very little
Review Team).
6. 47 U.S.C. § 310(d) (stating that no wireless station license "shall be transferred,
assigned, or disposed of in any manner, voluntarily or involuntarily, directly or indirectly, or
by transfer of control of any corporation holding such permit or license, to any person
except upon application to the Commission and upon finding by the Commission that the
public interest, convenience, and necessity will be served thereby."); id. § 214(a) (stating
that "[n]o carrier... [may] acquire or operate any line. .. unless and until there shall first

have been obtained from the Commission a certificate that the present or future public
convenience and necessity require or will require the construction, or operation, or
construction and operation, of such additional or extended line.').
7. See Dow, Nasdaq Rise in Shortened Session, WASH. PosT, July 3, 2000, at E02
("Verizon, the company formed from the completion of the $59 billion merger of Bell
Atlantic and GTE."); Seth Schiesel, A PracticalSohtion; FCC's Give and Take in SBCAmeritech Merger Deal, N.Y. TIEs, July 1, 1999, at Cl ("At first blush, the $72 billion
deal announced Tuesday with the Federal Communications Commission seems a high-

stakes gamble-with SBC Communications Inc. betting as much as $2.3 billion that it can
compete in 30 markets within 30 months for the right to acquire Ameritech.").
8. If licensees decline to negotiate, the Commission has the authority, for example, to
subject the licensees to an extended hearing before an administrative law judge to resolve
any factual issues arising out of the transaction. Id. § 309(e) "If... a substantial and
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"voluntariness" about this process.
When the licensee proposes the "voluntary conditions" and the
Commission adopts them, there is little or no basis for judicial review
because the conditions are all characterized as "voluntary." 9 Although
Congress has questioned the FCC's process at times, it has thus far chosen

not to offer a legislative solution to the unpredictable, lengthy, and
demanding FCC license-transfer process. ° Absent judicial or congressional
oversight, the Commission has a free hand to impose its view of the public

interest without many of the legal or procedural restraints that typically
cabin FCC activities.
The license-transfer process not only is used by the Commission to
achieve its goals outside the traditional policy-maldng process, it also has
provided a similar opportunity for the Executive Branch to act away from
the bright lights of legal scrutiny. When license transfers involve foreign
ownership," the Justice Department and the Federal Bureau of

Investigations ("FBI") have at times raised national security concerns.
Rather than utilizing the statutory process designed for such Executive
Branch review, these agencies instead have latched onto the FCC's licensetransfer process.' 2 Under this strategy, the Executive Branch files an
material question of fact is presented or the Commission for any reason is unable to make
the finding specified... [public interest, convenience and necessity] ... it shall formally
designate the application for hearing.... 'Id
9. Conceivably, other parties could challenge the merger approval, but their ability to
succeed on the merits based on a claim that the transfer is not in the "public interest' seems
remote at best. Moreover, parties outside the transaction are unlikely to challenge the
conditions as beyond the FCC's jurisdiction-the central premise of this Article.
10. Nonetheless, a great deal of legislation is currently pending. See S. 467, 106th
Cong. (1999); ER. 2783, 106th Cong. (1999); S. 1125, 106th Cong. (1999). This bill
would "restrict the authority of the [FCC] to review mergers and to impose conditions on
licenses and other authorizations assigned or transferred in the course of mergers or other
transactions subject to review by the Department of Justice or the Federal Trade
Commission." S. 1125, 106th Cong. (1999); See also H.R. 2533, 106th Cong. (1999)
(designed to amend the Clayton Act and Administrative Procedures Act.); H.R. 4019, 106th
Cong. (1999) (The Telecommunications Merger Review Act of 2000 would amend the
Communications Act to prohibit the FCC, in any proceeding to approve an application to
assign or transfer control of a telecommunications license, permit, or certificate, from (1)
denying such application unless such assignment will result in a violation of FCC rules and
such violation cannot be cured by a conditional approval, or (2) conditioning such approval
except to the extent necessary to ensure compliance with such rules. The bill would also
require all action on such applications to be completed within ninety days after FCC receipt
of the application, unless the applicant requests an extension.).
11. See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 310(a)-(b) (mandating that station licenses may not be granted
to or held by foreign governments or by any corporation organized or controlled by a
foreign government).

12. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(a)-(k) (1994). Pursuant to section 721 of the Defense

Production Act of 1950 (also known as the "Exon-Florio Provision"), the President
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objection to the license transfers with the Commission-often late in the
process-and then offers to withdraw that objection only if the licensees
"volunteer" to undertake certain obligations. 3 Once again, the "voluntary"
nature of the obligations insulates the Executive Branch's demands from
judicial review. The FCC, for its part, uses its procedural discretion to wait
for the Executive Branch to withdraw its objection before it will approve
the transaction. The entire process leaves the licensee all too willing to
accede to any Executive Branch demands, because, as discussed above, the
license-transfer process itself is largely free from judicial review.
Finally, the Commission also uses the consent decree process to attain
policy goals outside the strictures of the statute and the courts. Licensees
who have engaged in wrongdoing are most often either (1) approached
privately by the FCC in the hope of reaching a consent decree before the
alleged violations become public, or (2) subjected to Notices of Apparent
Liability (sometimes amounting to millions of dollars) that commence an
enforcement proceeding. 4 Facing immense liability, horrible publicity, and
the prospect of a potentially prolonged hearing process (possibly at both the
Commission and in the courts), licensees understandably seek a
"voluntary" deal. Licensees, who deal with the FCC virtually every day on
a wide variety of issues, cannot afford to risk their relationships with the
agency for a prolonged period. This is especially true in an era when highranking Commission officials openly discuss the impact of various policy
battles on the "good will" of the agency. 5 Therefore, the licensee has every
incentive to reach a "voluntary" decree as soon as practicable. Voluntary
consent decrees with narrow terms closely linked to the alleged misconduct
authorized the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States ("CFIUS") to handle

these issues. See 53 Fed. Reg. 43,999 (1988); see also Robert N. Cappucci, Notes:
Amending the Treatment of Defense Production Enterprises Under the U.S. Exon-Florio
Provision: A Move Toward Protectionism or Globalism 16 FORDHAM INT'L LJ. 652
(1993). CFIUS may not address each license transfer that has been subjected to Executive
Branch comment. That limitation on their authority, however, provides all the more reason

not to allow the Executive Branch to use the FCC's process to expand its congressionally
defined reach. See 31 C.F.R. pt. 800 (1999).
13. See infra Section III(B)(2) (discussing various transactions subject to Executive
Branch review).
14. See Qwest Comm. Int'l, Inc., Order, FCC 00-254 (July 21, 2000), 2000 WL
1015429 (F.C.C.) [hereinafter Qwest, Order] (holding Qwest liable for forfeiture in the
amount of $2,080,000); Business Discount Plan, Inc., Orderfor Forfeiture,FCC 00-239
(July 17, 2000), 2000 WL 973258 (F.C.C.) [hereinafter Business Discount Plan, Order]
(assessing a $2,400,000 forfeiture against Business Discount Plan, Inc.); see generally 47
U.S.C. § 503(b)(4) (establishing liability for forfeiture).
15. FCC Chairman William E. Kennard, Broadcasting and Digital: The Best of Two
Futures, Remarks Before the National Association of Broadcasters (Apr. 11, 2000) ("Why
have you squandered your goodwill to fight churches and schools and community
organizations?").
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can serve an important function in bringing a prompt and just end to
enforcement proceedings. The current Commission has been far more
aggressive, however, in defining the scope of these voluntary decrees. This
aggressiveness is made possible because there is nothing that limits the
scope of such "voluntary" decrees. Even if there were such formal
limitations on the agency, consent decrees often require licensees to waive
their rights to judicial review.' 6 Thus, in enforcement proceedings as well,
the FCC retains a virtual free hand.

I. USING LICENSEES' VULNERABILITY TO PURSUE GOALS
OUTSIDE THE TRADITIONAL POLICY-MAING PROCESS
Having freed itself from the legal boundaries that traditionally inform
and contain its policy initiatives, the current Commission in these three
contexts has been able to pursue its version of the public interest with
particular zeal. As described above, the Commission has the advantage of
an anxious, if not willing, victim: the licensees. Perhaps this result would
not be so troubling except that the Commission uses this remarkable power
to override the its statutory limits. Most fundamentally, the Commission
uses these situations to achieve policy outcomes it could not gain through
judicially reviewable channels.17 As an independent agency, the
Commission exists to exercise certain enumerated functions delegated by
Congress. 8 When an agency exceeds its limited functions, it undermines
the very foundation of its own legal existence. Moreover, the Commission
creates conditions it cannot and will not enforce, undermining
transparency, efficiency, and basic fairness by creating vast companyspecific regulatory regimes. The pattern is remarkably consistent and
consistently disturbing.
A. License Transfers
1. The Proper Scope of License-Transfer Decisions
The Commission has clear authority, under sections 214 and 310 of

16. See MCI WorldCom Comms., Inc., Order, FCC 00-205, para. 7 (June 6, 2000),
2000 WL 725473 (F.C.C.) [hereinafter MCI, Order];Qwest, Order,supra note 14, para. 7;

see also New York State Dep't of Law v. FCC, 984 F.2d 1209, 1213-17 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
17. The Commission uses the indirect "voluntary" conditions path to achieve policy
goals it cannot obtain directly. Such back-door tactics have troubled courts. See Natural Res.
Def. Council, Inc. v. EPA, 683 F.2d 752, 763 n.23 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
18. In this way, independent agencies are certainly not like courts, free to fashion
equitable relief as they see fit. Agencies like the FCC only have the powers that Congress
grants them.
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the Act, to review the transfers of licenses from one entity to another.' 9 The
Act also grants the Commission authority to condition section 310 license
transfers and section 214 authorizations. 20 Nothing in either statutory

provision contemplates FCC jurisdiction to approve or disapprove
corporate mergers as a whole?'
The FCC's license-transfer process should provide the Commission
with an opportunity to review a proposed transfer to assess its compliance
with current rules. Indeed, this is exactly what the Commission does for the
vast majority of the tens of thousands of licenses that change hands every

year.22 The FCC's actions should be nondiscriminatory, routine, and
predictable. As Commissioner Furchtgott-Roth has described, license
transfers should be like trips to the Department of Motor Vehicles-where

19. Section 310 holds that:
[n]o construction permit or station license ... shall be transferred ... directly or

indirectly, or by transfer of control of any corporation holding such permit or
license, to any person except upon application to the Commission and upon
finding by the Commission that the public interest, convenience, and necessity
will be served thereby.
47 U.S.C. § 310(b)(4)(d). Similarly, section 214 mandates that:
[n]o carrier shall undertake the construction of a new line or of an extension of
any line, or shall acquire or operate any line, or extension thereof, or shall engage
in transmission over or by means of such additional or extended line, unless and
until there shall first have been obtained from the Commission a certificate that
the present or future public convenience and necessity require... such additional
or extended line.
Id. § 214(a).
20. Section 303(r) provides that, except as otherwise provided in this Act, "the
Commission... shall... prescribe such. .. conditions, not inconsistentwith law, as may be
necessary to carry out the provisions of this [Act]." Id § 303(r) (emphasis added). And
section 214(c) states that the Commission "may attach to the issuance of [a section 214]
certificate such terms and conditions as in its judgment the public convenience and necessity
may require." Id § 214(c).
21. The FCC does possess authority to review mergers under the Clayton Act. Id. §
21(a) (granting FCC authority to enforce Clayton Act where applicable to common carriers
engaged in wire or radio communication or radio transmission of energy). That authority,
however, has not been invoked in any of the examples discussed herein. The Commission's
failure to invoke this authority may stem from its reluctance to face the judicial scrutiny that
may accompany review of Clayton Act decisions in light of the substantial precedent that
would constrain FCC authority. See, e.g., California v. Am. Stores Co., 495 U.S. 271 (1990)
(providing divestiture as a form of "injunctive relief' in Clayton Act cases); Cargill, Inc. v.
Monfort of Colorado, Inc., 479 U.S. 104 (1986) (requiring proof of antitrust injury);
Bankamerica Corp. v. United States, 462 U.S. 122 (1983) (barring interlocking directorates
between a bank and a competing insurance company).
22. The Wireless Bureau alone processed more than 40,000 such licenses in 1999. See
Thomas Sugrue, Chief of Wireless Telecomm. Bureau, Wireless Bureau Chief Declares
Backlog Reduction Program A Success; 99% of Backlog Eliminated, available at
http://wvw.fcc.gov/wtb/reportsindex.htm (last visited Oct. 26, 2000).
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everyone is treated exactly the same!3

2. The Commission's Actual Practice
The current Commission takes a different view. Today's Commission
singles out "important" license-transfer cases for "special" treatment.
Unfortunately, no publicly available criteria determine which licensees the
FCC selects for this special treatment, nor is there any predictable
timeframe for a decision. Instead, the transaction is left hanging-waiting
for some word from the Commission. In many cases, all the other
transaction processes have been completed long before the FCC signals its
intentions. Companies-facing pressure from all quarters to close the
transaction-feel they have little choice but to come calling on the
Commission, hats in hand, prepared to "voluntarily" do almost anything to
close the deal. In the end, the current Commission often insists on
extensive "voluntary" license-transfer conditions.24 These conditions are
based on some vague sense of competition and antitrust policy-areas
clearly and effectively dealt with by the Justice Department or the Federal
Trade Commission.2

3. The Weaknesses of the Current Commission's Approach
Faced with a willing licensee, the current FCC has been far too eager
to use these circumstances to expand its regulatory reach and create vast

and often unenforceable company-specific regulatory conditions-all in the
name of the public interest. The ultimate decision leaves an administrative
mess for the Enforcement Bureau and the public to sort out.
Through this process, the FCC has expanded its regulatory reach to
23. See FCC Commissioner Harold Furchtgott-Roth, The Realpolitik of Regulation:
Offensive and Defensive Strategies, Speech Before the American Enterprise Institute,
Amgen Forum (Apr. 28, 2000), available at http:lwwv.fcc.gov/SpeecheslFurchtgottRoth/
2000/sphfr005.html; FCC Commissioner Harold Furchtgott-Roth, Competition and
Regulation, Speech Before the David T. Chase Free Enterprise Institute (Apr. 26, 2000)
availableat http:llwww.fcc.gov/SpeecheslFurchtgottLRoth/sphfr006.html.
24. Conditioning license grants is a time-honored and legitimate practice at the
Commission. The current Commission differs, however, in its use of these conditions to
achieve such far-reaching and sometimes unrelated policy goals that may not have been
obtainable through the rulemaking process.
25. See 15 U.S.C. § 4301 (1994) (establishing the procedure under which businesses
notify the Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission of their cooperative
ventures). If there was ever any doubt about the Justice Department's willingness to apply
traditional antitrust principles in the telecommunications field, one need look no further than
the proposed MCI/Sprint deal. See Peter S. Goodman, U.S. Suit Sinks Merger Of
WorldCon, Sprint, WAsH. POST, June 28, 2000, at Al. Regardless of how one feels about
the merits of the Justice Department's decision, it leaves little doubt that the Justice
Department is fully capable of evaluating these issues without the FCC checking its work.
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include transfer conditions that go far beyond the rules applicable to other
similarly situated providers. For example, in the SBC/Ameritech
transaction, the "voluntary" conditions limit the number of services and
facilities that may be offered to competitive local exchange carriers
("CLECs") on a promotional basis.26 Once the caps are reached, some
CLECs will be unable to obtain the same promotional deals as others. Not
only does such intrusive regulation extend the FCC's regulatory reach into
the internal business decisions of licensees, it potentially obligates the
merged company to violate the terms of the Act itself.27 Similarly, the
FCC's decision also requires SBC/Ameritech to charge certain rates for
surrogate line-sharing services.28 Despite a specific section 252 process for
setting these rates at the state commission level, the FCC has arrogated
authority to itself over pricing matters for merging companies. 2' Thus,
when faced with policy goals "obstructed" by statutory or judicial
impediments, the Commission can simply achieve the same goals under the
guise of "voluntary" merger conditions.
As Commissioner Furchtgott-Roth has pointed out, the vast
regulatory regime created via merger conditions also generates intense
pressure on the agency's enforcement apparatus." For example, the new
SBC/Ameritech entity now falls subject to the detailed requirements of
thirty separate conditions filling seventy-two pages of text!' These
requirements exist in addition to, and in some cases supplant, the rules and
regulations that already apply to all similarly situated carriers. Even
assuming the Commission diverts the resources to administer dozens of
individualized regulatory regimes (which seems unlikely), the
corresponding and inevitable decline in the Commission's non-merger
26. See Application of Ameritech Corp. and SBC Comms., Inc., Memorandum Opinion
and Order, 14 F.C.C.R. 14,712, para. 217, 18 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 1 (1999) (Furchtgott-

Roth concurring in part and dissenting in part) (explaining that the use of voluntary
standards allows administrative agencies to effectively skirt statutory limits on their

authority, an offense to the concept of administrative agencies in possession of only those
powers delegated to them by Congress) [hereinafter SBC/Ameritech, Memorandum Opinion
and Order].

27. See 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(3) (Supp. IV 1998) (establishing a telecommunications
carrier's duty to provide nondiscriminatory access to network elements on an unbundled
basis); id. § 251(c)(4)(b) (imposing a duty on carriers not to prohibit or impose unreasonable
or discriminatory conditions on the resale of telecommunications services).
28. SBC/Ameritech, Memorandum Opinion and Order, supra note 26, para. 365; see
also iL app. C, para. 8(b).

29. See 47 U.S.C. § 252; 47 C.F.R. §§ 20,50-51,90 (1999).
30. There remains, however, a threshold issue of how enforceable a "voluntary"
condition really is. If it were truly voluntary, then these conditions would have no binding
legal impact on the licensee.
31. See SBC/Ameritech, Memorandum Opinionand Order,supra note 26, app. C.
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enforcement activities undoubtedly undermines the integrity of the FCC's
other policies. Alternatively, if such resources are not diverted, the
Commission appears to be busy promulgating rules it will not enforce. In
either case, the development of extensive
32 company-specific merger
issues.
enforcement
difficult
raises
conditions
Extracting detailed and ongoing "voluntary" regulatory concessions
also harms transparency and thereby threatens consumer interests. If
consumers wish to learn about the regulatory obligations of their local
telecommunications company, they should be able to pick up a copy of the
FCC's regulations and determine the scope of the carrier's responsibilities.
Similarly, competitors (particularly interconnecting or reselling CLECs)
should be able to expect uniform regulatory behavior by similarly situated
companies. Indeed, one of the core appeals of federalizing certain areas of
communications policy has been to develop uniform national standards that
apply to all similarly situated carriers.33 Regulation by merger condition
undercuts this core value.
The Baby Bells illustrate this problem. Qwest/US West has one set of
conditions, GTE/BeI Atlantic (now Verizon) another, and SBC/Ameritech/
SNET/Pacific Telesis a third.! Only BellSouth customers can reliably look
to the Code of Federal Regulations for any definitive insight into the
applicable regulations. Moreover, the "voluntary" negotiation process
seems to leave little substantive opportunity for the public to participate
meaningfully in the policy-making process. Thus, virtually unreviewable
agency power in license-transfer proceedings spawns an unwieldy
regulatory hydra that is difficult to enforce and even harder for the public to
ascertain.
B. The Executive Branch'sNationalSecurity Review
1. The Proper Scope of Executive Branch Participation in
Licensing Decisions
Unfortunately, the FCC not only utilizes the licensing process to
extract its own concessions, it actually allows other government agencies to
32. The Commission has compounded these problems in part by creating a Merger
Compliance Oversight Team that has its own set of rules (never approved by the
Commission) that has extraordinary discretion in the enforcement of license transfer related
obligations. See, e.g., Oversight Team to Monitor Compliance with Common Carrier
Merger Conditions, PublicNotice, DA 00-1553 (July 11, 2000), 2000 WL 958877 (F.C.C.).

33. See AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366,371 (1999).
34. For example, only SBC/Ameritech is obligated to provide competitive local service
in thirty markets, where it does operate as an incumbent local exchange carrier ('LECs").
'See SBC/Ameritech, MemorandumOpinion and Order,supranote 26,app. C,para. 59(a).
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do the same. The Act and FCC policy establish a role for Executive Branch

agencies in the license-transfer process. Under section 214, the FCC must
notify a number of parties upon the receipt of an application: the Secretary
of Defense, the Secretary of State, and the governor of each state in which
the line will run. 35 The statute also creates a "right to those notified to be
heard.,, 36 Similarly, the Commission has determined that "appropriate
Executive Branch agencies" must be consulted whenever the agency
reviews section 310 requests. 37
Where the proposed section 214 license holder is a foreign or foreign-

affiliated carrier, the Commission has explained that the FCC will consider
"any such legitimate concerns [from the Executive Branch regarding
national security or law enforcement] as we undertake our own
independent analysis of whether grant of a particular authorization is in the
'
Such consideration is consistent with the FCC's
public interest."38

international obligations, which provide for "essential security" exceptions
under Articles XIV bis of the GATS.39 Thus, consistent with our precedent
and international obligations, the Commission should notify and consider

the comments of the Executive Branch in assessing whether a given
licensing decision is in the public interest.

To the extent that the Executive Branch has significant concerns
about the national security implications of a given transaction, Congress
has created an Executive Branch review process with strict timeframes to

assess all transactions throughout the economy. 0 Under the statute, "[t]he
35. 47 U.S.C. § 214(b) (1994).
36. Id.
37. Rules and Policies on Foreign Participation in the U.S. Telecomm. Market, Report
and Orderand Order on Recons., 12 F.C.C.R. 23,891, para. 113, 10 Comm. Reg. (P & F)
750 (1998) (petition for reconsideration pending).
38. Amendment of the Comm'n's Regulatory Policies to Allow Non-U.S. Licensed
Space Stations to Provide Domestic and Int'l Service in the U.S., Report and Order, 12
F.C.C.R. 24,094, para. 179, 10 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 587 (1998). Ironically, "[w]e
emphasize[d] ... that we expect national security, law enforcement, foreign policy and trade
policy concerns to be raised in very rare circumstances. Contrary to the fears of some
commentors [sic], the scope of the concerns that the Executive Branch will raise in the
context [of transfers] ...is narrow and well-defined [sic]." Id. para. 180.
39. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade - Multilateral Trade Negotiations
(The Uruguay Round): General Agreement on Trade in Services, Dec. 15, 1993, 33 I.L.M.
44,59 (1994).
40. See 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(a)-(k) (1994). Pursuant to section 721 of the Defense
Production Act, the President authorized the CFIUS to review foreign acquisitions of U.S.
companies for national security purposes. According to the statute, the President conducts
an investigation to determine the effects of proposed or pending mergers, acquisitions, and
takeovers on national security. If it is determined that an investigation is necessary, the
investigation must commence no later than thirty days after the President's receipt of written
notification of the transaction in question, and the investigation must be completed no later
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President ...may make an investigation to determine the effects on
national security of mergers, acquisitions, and takeovers ... by or with
foreign persons which could result in foreign control of persons engaged in
interstate commerce in the United States."4 The President may then
"suspend or prohibif' such transaction if a number of statutory findings are
42
made. The President has delegated these responsibilities to the Committee
on Foreign Investment in the United States ("CFJUS"). 3 Thus, the
Executive Branch has its own structure to review and potentially block, or
condition, any communications-related transaction that creates substantial

national security concems4 Congress has explicitly set the respective roles
of the Executive Branch and the Commission in these transactions. The
Commission receives comment on national security and other public
interest issues from the Executive Branch as part of its independent review
of a given transaction. 45 The Executive Branch itself may block (or
condition) transactions directly through the CFIUS. The statutes speak
directly on these matters.

2. The FCC's Actual Practice
Undeterred by the clear statutory language, today's FCC licensing
process takes a different approach. The Commission facilitates the
demands of the Executive Branch 46 by refusing to approve licensing until

the applicants reach a "voluntary" agreement with the Executive Branch
than forty-five days after such a determination is made. The President must make an
investigation in any case in which an entity controlled by a foreign government seeks to
engage in a transaction that could affect national security, which is subject to the time
limitations stated above. No documentary material may be made public, and such material is
exempt from disclosure under 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2000). The President must announce a
decision to take action to suspend or prohibit any transaction no later than fifteen days after
an investigation is completed. National security considerations include, among other factors,
domestic production required for national defense; availability of human resources,
products, and technology to meet national defense requirements; control of domestic
industries and commercial activities of foreign citizens; and potential effects of the
transaction on sales of military goods, equipment, or technology to another country. The
President must report to Congress the determination of whether to take action, and shall
direct the issuance of regulations to carry out these efforts.
41. Id. §2170(a).
42. Id. § 2170(d).
43. See supranote 12.
44. For example, in the recent NT/Nerio deal, CFIUS signed off on the transactions
only after receiving assurances that certain steps would be taken to protect national security
and law enforcement efforts. See Margo McCall, NTTIVerio OK Provides Hints for
Voicestream, WMELESS WEEK, Aug. 21, 2000, at 10.
45. See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 214(b) (1994).
46. Usually these agencies include the Department of Justice and the Federal Bureau of
Investigations.
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agencies. 47 The FCC does not require the Executive Branch to use its own
statutory authority to evaluate the transaction. Instead, the Commission
permits the Executive Branch to use the vulnerability and non-reviewability
created by the licensing process to extract desired concessions." For
example, in one recent proceeding, the FCC accepted the Executive
Branch's filing eleven months after the deadline for public comment, and
then waited seven more months for the Executive Branch to reach its
"voluntary" agreement with the applicants. 49 Only then did the Executive
Branch withdraw its objections. The Executive Branch's withdrawal,
however, was conditioned on the FCC's willingness to incorporate the
"voluntary" side agreement as a merger condition. 0 The FCC approved the
transaction only after this entire eighteen-month process was completed.
By using the FCC's merger process, the Executive Branch avoids the more
standards and timetables that would constrain their
rigorous and defined
51
CFlS review.

Licensees, for their part, have little choice but to go along. Absent
agreement to the "voluntary" conditions, licensees have no certainty as to if
or when the Commission will act on their applications. With their
transactions hanging in the balance, licensees must accede to the Executive
Branch's demands.
3. The Weaknesses of the Current Commission's Approach
Not surprisingly, with such eager licensees, the Executive Branch's
conditions contain provisions that the FCC could never promulgate under

47. See Applications of SatCom Sys., Inc., TMI Comms. and Co., L.P. and SatCom
Sys. Inc., Order and Authorization, 14 F.C.C.R. 20,798, 20,847, 18 Comm. Reg. (P & F)

1164 (1999) [hereinafter TMAJSatCom, Order] (lamenting the delay caused by the FBI,
"effectively creat[ing] an 18-month freeze on our approval process"). If nothing else, the
Commission could handle these Executive Branch concerns far more efficiently and
effectively if the Executive Branch spoke with one voice on these matters (instead of
hearing from the National Telecommunications and Information Administration, FBI, State

Department, etc., independently) and if there were some reasonable timelines imposed on
this process (preferably the standard notice and comment schedule).

48. See Neal King, Jr. & David S.Cloud, Global Phone Deals Face Scrutinyfrom New
Source: the FBI, WALL ST. J., Aug. 24, 2000 at Al (for an extensive discussion of these
issues).
49. See TMISatCom, Order,supranote 47, 14 F.C.C.R. 20,798, paras. 2,5,7.1.
50. kl para. 1. Although license-transfer proceedings are most likely to grab headlines,

initial licensing of foreign-affiliated companies may also be subject to this level of
Executive Branch scrutiny. TMI/SatCom, for example, involved an initial ground station
license for a Canadian company.
51. In addition, the independence of the FCC erodes each time the Commission contorts

its processes to accommodate the Executive Branch.
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its own authority.52 For example, in the case of TMI/SatCom, the side
agreement requires the company to furnish recent employment and
residence history and biographical information for persons who occupy
Sensitive Network Positions. 53 Certainly other similarly situated licensees
are under no such obligation, and it is certainly not clear that the FCC alone
has the authority to create such a requirement. In a similar vein, the side
agreement requires TMI to make its facilities available for inspection and
its employees available for interviews by Justice Department and FBI
personnel." Without the license-transfer process, it seems unlikely that the
FCC could independently impose such requirements.
From an enforcement perspective, such -side agreements place the
Commission in the awkward position of enforcing a contract between the
licensee and a third party. Yet the license transfer is explicitly conditioned
on that agreement, creating at least an implicit FCC obligation to enforce
it.55 In addition, the TMI side agreement calls for the parties to seek judicial
enforcement of the agreement or "move for relief from the FCC. 5 6 The
FCC is thus obligated to interpret and enforce another government
agency's contract with a licensee. Is the FCC really prepared to intervene
every time the Justice Department or the licensee wishes to substantively
alter the mandates in the side agreement? Alternatively, if the FCC takes a
more hands-off approach, the agreement does not appear to mean what it
says.
The Executive Branch's agreements also contribute to the
proliferation of disparate regulatory obligations for seemingly similarly
situated entities. There has never been a public and comprehensive look at
the security risks posed by foreign investment in our telecommunications
infrastructure. Carriers and the public have never really had full notice and
opportunity to comment on what constitutes a reasonable set of technical
and business mandates to maintain national security when a carrier is
foreign-owned. Certainly, the Commission has not made any assessment in
this regard. Equally troubling is the lack of consistency in the application of
these side agreements. They have changed from proceeding to proceeding,
and the Executive Branch has not imposed any industry-wide obligations.
Instead, the approach has been one of stumbling incrementalism and
remarkable delay; each proceeding has created its own evolved set of
52. See TMI/SatCom, Order,supra note 47, para. 3.6. Most prominently, the Executive
Branch required that the companies keep all equipment for domestic traffic in the United
States. Id
53. See id para. 7.3.

54. Idpara. 8.1.
55. See id para. 2.1.
56. See TMA/SatCom, Order,supranote 47, para. 11.2.
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obligations on a different time schedule.5 7 Once again, the American public
can thoroughly search in the Code of FederalRegulations but will not find
the distinct obligations imposed on some foreign entrants. Such a companyspecific approach under the auspices of the FCC does not promote
consistency, transparency, or predictability.
C. Consent Decrees in Enforcement Actions

1. The Proper Scope of Consent Decrees
In addition to the commitments that can be extracted while awaiting
approval of their license transfers, licensees are also particularly vulnerable
to Commission demands in the context of enforcement proceedings.
Formal enforcement actions are often initiated through a Notice of
Apparent Liability.5 8 After the pleading cycle is complete, the Commission
issues an Order assessing all of the evidence and announcing any
punishment. If the licensee then fails to pay any forfeiture or continues to
contest the underlying facts, the government must bring suit in federal
court for a trial de novo on the underlying claims in order to collect any
forfeiture.59 Rather than engage in this prolonged process, the licensee and
the Commission's enforcement team-either prior to the initial notice or at
some point during the enforcement action-will often sit down to
57. This point is illustrated by a comparison between the "Disputes" section in the
November 1999 TMIISatCom Order and the corresponding "Disputes and Non-Impact on
Other Government Action" of the October 1999 AT&TIBT Order.Compare id. app. A art.
11.2 (noting that a "party may bring an appropriate action for judicial relief in a U.S. court
of competent jurisdiction or move for relief from the FCC" and not discussing criminal
sanctions) with In the Matter of AT&T Corp., British Telecommunications, plc, VLT Co.
L.L.C., Violet License Co. LLC, and TNV [Bahamas] Limited Applications, Memorandum
Opinion and Order, 14 F.C.C.R. 19,140, app. B art. 4.3.1, 18 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 420
(1999) (permitting any "Party to bring an action against the other Party for appropriate
judicial relief" or "[a]lternatively (1) the DoJ, the FBI, or DoD may bring an action for
relief (including equitable relief) before the FCC, and (2) the Affiliates and the Company
may petition the FCC for a declaratory ruling with respect to the Affiliates' or the
Company's obligations under this agreemenf'; also explicitly preserving the government's
rights to pursue other remedies including criminal sanction under Article 4.4 of the
agreement.).
58. See Notice of Apparent Liability for Forfeiture of Ensearch Corp., ForfeitureOrder,
FCC 00-268 (July 27, 2000), 2000 WL 1028741 (F.C.C.); Qwest, Order, supra note 14
(holding Qwest liable for forfeiture in the amount of $2,080,000); Business Discount Plan,
Order,supra note 14 (assessing a $2,400,000 forfeiture against Business Discount Plan,
Inc.). At times, the notification is less public through investigatory letters sent to the
targeted companies. In these cases, the consent decrees adopted below may be issued
without any public knowledge regarding the infraction. Obviously, these privately
negotiated agreements have even greater appeal to licensees because they limit the public
relations damage caused by the alleged violations.
59. As a practical matter, such federal court proceedings are extremely rare.
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"negotiate" the terms of a consent decree."' As discussed above, there is no
formal procedure through statute or regulation for the negotiation or
judicial review of such decrees. Indeed, many of these decrees require the
licensee to waive any rights to appeal. 6 Therefore, the Commission has
tremendous leverage in these proceedings.
Consent decrees are a valuable procedural tool in the Commission's
arsenal. They permit proceedings to be concluded in a prompt and efficient
fashion without the consumption of vast litigation resources. Licensees
who violate the FCC's rules should be punished and closely monitored for
future violations. Repeat offenders should be subject to serious fines.
Consent decrees also provide opportunities for the Commission to receive
commitments from licensees that programs and policies are in place to
prevent future misconduct. Decree terms, however, should be tied directly
to the alleged misconduct and should impose only those mandates that the
FCC intends to monitor and enforce.

2. The FCC's Actual Practice
The Commission's practice is far different. Licensees often spend
months "negotiating" these consent decrees. The decrees often include
large monetary payments and the compliance plans discussed above. The
decrees, however, also often include extensive terms not directly related to
the violations. From advertising campaigns to employment policies, the
current Commission seeks to require licensees to do its version of the "right
thing." Licensees, eager to reach agreements, often "volunteer" for
additional measures in an effort to lessen the consent decrees' forfeiture
amounts. This confluence of circumstances, together with the lack of
judicial review, means virtually all business practices even remotely related
to the conduct at issue are often on the table.
3. The Weaknesses of the Current Commission's Approach
The Commission's current consent decree approach often reaches far
beyond the traditional scope of its jurisdiction, imposes conditions that are
detailed and often unwieldy to enforce, and creates numerous and distinct
company-specific regulatory requirements. Most disturbing, the
Commission uses the consent decree process to achieve policy goals that it
likely could not achieve through judicially reviewable regulatory action.
These consent decrees are breathtaking in their scope. For example, under
one recent decree, MCI WorldCom is required to fire employees the first
60. Negotiations often occur at various stages of the process, including before or after
the Notice of Apparent Liability.
61. See MCI, Order,supra note 16, para. 7; Qwest, Order,supra note 14, para. 7.
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time the employee "use[s] ...profanity during a sales call" or "harass[es]"
a customer.62 The same decree mandates that a new "Telemarketing Code
of Conduct" be administered to all current and new employees.6 3 These
policies may well be the best business practices for any given licensee, but
they clearly lie outside the traditional scope of the Commission's
regulations. The FCC is not the Labor Department. The Commission does
not have jurisdiction over telemarketing per se. 4 The vulnerable position of
a licensee subject to an enforcement action should not be used to impose
the Commission's view of "best practices" simply because, absent judicial
review, the FCC has the ability to do so.
Not only do the consent decree terms extend far beyond the agency's
normal reach, they impose detailed and extensive provisions that are
difficult to monitor and enforce. For example, the FCC has neither the
expertise nor the resources to police carriers' labor and employment
practices. Is the FCC prepared to define and adjudicate what it means
"harass"? What happens when an employee is fired for using profanity
during a sales call? Does he sue his employer or the Commission? Is the
FCC prepared to receive complaints from consumers and take actions
against individual employees? Similar concerns arise vis-h-vis consent
decree provisions regarding advertising practices, and business
management. 6 5
Even if the FCC had some level of expertise in these areas, consent
decrees often mandate highly specific and detailed carrier actions that seem
to go far beyond what the agency is prepared to enforce. For example,
Qwest, as part of a mandated media campaign, must, within six months of
approval of the decree, "distribute brochures and place media advertising
for consumers who do not speak English as their primary language, in their
language of choice. ' Yet there are hundreds of "languages of choice," so
the full scope of this obligation is not at all clear. If a Croatian immigrant
complains to the Commission that Qwest failed to have advertising
62. See MCI, Order,supra note 16, para. 12.
63. Id para. 12.

64. For a general discussion of the proper scope of the Commission's role in advertising
regulation, see Bryan Tramont, Commission on the Verge of a JurisdictionalBreakdown:
The FCC and its Quest to Regulate Advertising, 8 CoMiLAw CONsPEcrus 219 (Summer

2000).

65. See Qwest, Order, supra note 14, para. 23 (requiring Qwest to devise and
implement a nationwide campaign to inform consumers who do not speak English of the
dangers of slamming and to display media advertising in their language of choice).

66. Id. It is also not clear how effective such a campaign would be at resolving the
apparent underlying problem. If, in response to a record of violations, the goal is to prevent
language barriers from facilitating slamming, then multilingual operators provide a much
more direct answer to this problem.
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available in her "language of choice," is the FCC prepared to pursue
enforcement action against Qwest? Similarly, if a licensee decides that
holding back thirty percent of a telemarketer's commissions for ninety days
is more appropriate than the decree's mandate to hold back twenty percent
for sixty days, is the licensee really required to petition the FCC for
"permission" to change this business practice? The Commission's consent
decree philosophy is perhaps well-intentioned, but the decree's legally
binding obligations must be no broader than the FCC will monitor and
enforce. Anything less undermines the Commission's credibility with its
licensees and the public.
Finally, consent decrees should attempt to limit, to the extent feasible,
the amount of carrier-specific regulation imposed. There is every reason to
treat those who disobey the Commission's rules differently from their
peers. It does not seem appropriate, however, to modify our rules regarding
the standards of care required, especially vis-h-vis consumers. For example,
the Qwest consent decree requires a carrier to establish a "stay away" list of
customers who have stated that they would never do business with Qwest;
customers remain on the list for a minimum of one year, unless they
request to be removed from the list. The Commission has detailed (and
different) regulations restricting telephone solicitation; in response to a
consumer request, telephone solicitors must place the consumer on a "donot-call list" for a period of ten years. 3 Presumably, the current rule
adequately protects consumers. In any event, the creation of a seemingly
more relaxed one-year period seems counterintuitive. Nonetheless, in
setting a different standard for some companies, the FCC seems to imply
that its generally applicable rules are inadequate. These differing
requirements also make it much more difficult for consumers to know their
rights or for outside parties to educate the public regarding those rights.
Imagine the challenges associated with a consumer "web site setting forth
the FCC's telemarketing rules, with a separate section for each carrier
bound by a different set of rules found in consent decrees scattered across
the FCC Record. Consumers would also be frustrated (and ultimately
unsuccessful) if they attempted to locate these standards in the Code of
Federal Regulations. Individualized obligations in consent decrees
ultimately hinder consumers' abilities to know their rights and to use the
Commission's enforcement procedures to their benefits.

67. Id. para. 20. These rules also apply to customers who have accused the carrier of
slamming.
68. 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200 (1999).

68
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IV. CONCLUSION
There is little doubt that the current Commission's affinity for
voluntary agreements is motivated by the goal of doing the "right thing" for
the public. Doing the "right thing" in a series of company-specific
adjudications, however, is not the job that Congress hired the FCC to do.
By freelancing in this way, outside the scope of judicial review, the FCC
undermines its institutional strength and public esteem. The true "right
thing" is for the FCC to behave as if Congress, the courts, and the
American people closely monitor its every move. By simply following the
law, enforcing the law, and arming consumers with the law, the FCC can
do the "right thing." There is no need for anyone to "volunteer" to do
anything else.

